Personalized electronic services, e.g. from the e-government domain, need to reliably identify and authenticate users. During user-authentication processes, the electronic identity of the respective user is determined and required additional attributes, e.g. name and date of birth, linked to this identity are collected. This attribute-collection process can become complex, especially if required attributes are distributed over various attribute providers that are organized in a federated identity-management system. In many cases, these identity management systems rely on different ontologies and make use of different languages. Hence, identity federations, such as the one currently established across the European Union, require effective solutions to collect user attributes from different heterogeneous sources and aggregate them to a holistic user facet. At the same time, these solutions need to comply with minimum disclosure rules to preserve users' privacy. In this article, we propose and introduce a solution for privacy-preserving attribute aggregation.
Introduction
Governments and public administrations face the challenge to continuously improve their e-government infrastructures in order to cope with fast-changing requirements and to provide citizens useful electronic services. During recent years, interoperability between e-government solutions has been on the agenda of many public-sector organisations [1] . In particular, achieving interoperability between different national 5 electronic identity (eID) solutions has been a topic of growing interest, as electronic identification and authentication are crucial building blocks of transactional e-government services.
The European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) are a prime example of this. For many years, EU MSs have developed and rolled out country-specific eID solutions independently from each other. As a result, citizens from, for example MS A have been unable to use their eIDs to authenticate at e-government 10 services provided in MS B, undermining the idea of a converging European society and a digital single market. To solve these issues, the EU has been committing efforts to the study of heterogeneity in existing European eID systems and the legal implications that need to be addressed when these systems aim to become interoperable. An example of the efforts committed to achieve interoperability between European e-government and eID solutions are the EU-funded Large Scale Pilots (LSP) eCodex 1 , epSOS 2 , PEPPOL 3 ,
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4 , STORK, and STORK 2.0 5 . Their goal is to bring interoperability to different public-sector domains such as justice, health care, and procurement. With regard to eID, the LSPs STORK and STORK 2.0 are especially worth mentioning, as they have yielded a first interoperability solution for national eID systems by developing an identity federation (IF) framework.
In general, an IF can be regarded as an association of multiple identity systems (ISs). An IF defines 20 a set of common attributes, information-exchange policies and sharing services, allowing for cooperation and transactions between IF members, i.e. between different identity systems [2] . An IS, in turn, typically contains, at least, a user, an Identity Provider (IdP), and a Service Provider (SP) acting as Relying Party (RP) [3, 4] . The IdP establishes, maintains, and secures the electronic identity linked with a subject (i.e. the user), and may also confirm the identity of that subject. From a technical perspective, the confirmed identity 25 of a subject comprises at least a unique identifier and a set of additional attributes such as first name, family name, or date of birth. The RP makes transaction decisions based upon receipt, validation, and acceptance of a subjects confirmed identity within the Identity System (IS). This way, SPs assuming the role of RPs can control access to their services and resources. In addition, an IS can also comprise one or more Attribute Providers (APs). An AP stores additional attributes for users. These attributes optionally enrich the user's 30 confirmed electronic identity. If required, SPs can request attributes for identified users from APs being part of the same IS.
The goal of an IF is to achieve interoperability between different ISs. An IF guarantees that IdPs, SPs/RPs, and APs from different ISs can interact with each other based on a defined attribute set. While of Knowledge (ZKPK) or Homomorphic Encryption appear to be appropriate approaches to reach this goal.
However, as attributes are based on different vocabularies in the given use case, these techniques cannot be applied directly. We show that Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) functions adequately address this issue, as demonstrated in [5] . LSH functions are ideal to preserve privacy while still enabling comparisons.
However, they cannot directly solve the problem of intersecting attribute sets to find the common universal 70 identifier facet. This requires comparing attributes from several APs, which may be arduous due to source heterogeneity [6] .
Ontologies appear to be a promising approach to tackling this issue, as they foster sharing and reuse of knowledge [7] . An ontology is a specification to use a certain terminology so that it is consistent with the theory defined in that ontology. The problem is that when dealing with diverse ISs within an identity 75 federation, it is unlikely that they all employ the same ontology to describe their information [8] . Furthermore, it is also unlikely that they even use the same language in their ontologies. This especially applies to real-world use cases such as pan-European identity federations as targeted by the EU.
Intersecting attribute sets from different APs relying on different ontologies and languages thus raises the demand for an appropriate ontology-mapping solution. In general, ontology mapping deals with the need to 80 reconcile ontologies that cover similar domains of knowledge but use different nomenclatures [8] . Priesnitz et al. [9] have assessed and ranked different ontology alignment solutions according to their effectiveness for the given scenario. Based on this and other previous works, we propose a solution for privacy-preserving attribute aggregation in identity federations.
Previous work has revealed that there are solutions available to promote ontology alignment [9] . Furthermore, there are also solutions available to assess the similarity between attributes based on blinded attribute values. However, so far no work has combined and employed these building blocks in a similar context, i.e. to aggregate user attributes in identity federations. Thus, there are still some open issues regarding ontology aligning in the presence of heterogeneity and attribute merging in an IF context. In this section, we describe 90 those identified.
Interoperability
Ontologies constitute a valuable knowledge-sharing resource. Still, there are some open issues regarding their potential in identity federations. Using ontologies to represent knowledge in this context is an important direction to achieve a consistent path towards the reliable exchange of user data. That way, extending their 95 usage in such a context could help in promoting semantic interoperability among involved entities of an IF. Even if IF entities already use ontologies to represent knowledge, it is improbable that they use the same ontology and the same language. This also applies to new entities joining these federations. It is not expectable that they all use the same language to develop their ontologies. Adjusting the different languages in the parties' ontologies to a common one and aligning them is hence a considerable improvement to achieve 100 semantic interoperability. Our solution proposed in this article addresses this issue.
Alignment Quality
In identity federations, entities usually interact with each other multiple times when exchanging user data. Accordingly, these several interactions can provide different levels of accuracy regarding the user data they exchange due to inevitable mistakes such as misspellings and abbreviations. Thus, assessing the 105 accuracy of exchanged data and feeding the alignment relations with those metrics each time two entities are interacting, can improve the confidence level. Our solution addresses this issue. As far as we are aware, no other work uses this kind of feature to improve the confidence level of exchanged and aligned data.
Alignment Alternatives
An alignment may result in no correspondence between key attributes from two APs despite having the 110 same user authenticated on both APs. In this case, it is not possible to establish a relation between those APs, even if they are part of an identity federation and share data about the same group of users. Using the relationships already stored can help in finding an AP chain, linking the two APs and providing the user attributes required by an SP. The solution proposed in this article addresses this issue by establishing chains of APs. 
Contribution
In this article, we propose a novel privacy-preserving approach to aggregate attributes within an identity federation. The proposed solution relies on LSH functions and ontology-alignment approaches. Based on these fundamental technologies, our proposal comprises the following features:
• an aligning history function (HF), which uses previous confidence level assessment values to increase 120 the reliability of the current CL;
• a third party attribute provider (AP T ) approach that allows the establishment of a chain of APs improving the confidence on the user identity, since he/she has key identifiers, among the involved APs;
• a multi-language strategy to handle several languages in identity federations' ontology definitions; and
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• an attribute-blinding method based on Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) functions to preserve users' privacy during attribute-aggregation processes.
The combination of all these features yields a comprehensive solution for privacy-preserving attribute aggregation. This way, this work contributes to improved user identification and authentication processes in identity federations. 
Structure
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 and Section 3 provide relevant background information and survey related work. From this survey, open issues are identified that are not covered by existing solutions.
Our proposal to address these issues is introduced in Section 4. A concrete implementation of the proposed solutions is presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we evaluate our solution by means of several experiments.
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Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 7.
Background
Identity Systems (ISs) manage information used to identify a user in a given environment (e.g. eID systems in e-government portals). Interoperability among ISs deals with exchanging user attributes allowing the user to use a specific service outside his/her system (e.g. public services). When one IS sends these 140 attributes to another IS, it is mandatory to keep user data private, disclosing just what is necessary for the execution of the respective action. To promote interoperability among ISs by means of an identity federation, there must be a common base of concepts to be used by all IS that wish to interact.
Ontologies are used to represent knowledge, but it is improbable that federated ISs use the very same ontology to represent the same knowledge [8] . Therefore, to allow ISs to communicate using a common 145 6 knowledge base requires a mechanism that analyzes all possible knowledge representations in involved ISs and merges them into a unified one to be used in this communication process. The solution proposed in this article accomplishes this task. In the following, fundamental concepts used by the proposed solution are briefly sketched.
Interoperability
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The absence of machine-readable descriptions impacts the quality and the efficiency of electronic services.
This, in turn, increases administrative burdens and makes the provision of services more expensive. Public Service (PS) descriptions delivered through e-Government portals are usually unstructured and not machinereadable [10] , which makes it hard for them to become interoperable.
Data interoperability, in an e-government context can be defined as the capability of all interacting 155 participants to access, reuse, and understand data in both human-to-machine and machine-to-machine formats [11] . Different representations, languages, purposes and syntaxes must be reconciled to reach a common understanding of the datas meaning and to achieve data interoperability. Interoperability is the ability of organisations to interact towards mutually agreed common goals. They interact sharing information and knowledge, through the business processes they support, exchanging data between their respective
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Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems [12] .
There are four distinct types of data interoperability [11] : technical, syntactic, organisational, and semantic. This work focuses on semantic interoperability. Semantic interoperability means that datasets have a common understanding of terminology: the same term means the same or these datasets apply that term in the same way.
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Semantic Web uses ontologies to define knowledge to address the interoperability issue [13] . Semantic
Web aims to extend current interfaces in a standardized machine-readable format, adding annotations for knowledge description to reach interoperability. Semantic interoperability (SI) depends on the services interfaces description and how the services clients share the meaning of the information [14] .
Identity Provider Proxy
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An Identity Provider Proxy (IdPP) centralizes integration of federated eID tokens by carrying out the authentication for the SP [15] . The SP does not take any action regarding any integration of eID tokens.
The IdPP (being a data controller or data processor) handles the data protection aspects.
For example, in the STORK project application context, there is one proxy service per Member State that handles its eIDs and SPs [15] . The Pan-European Proxy Service (PEPS) comprises two components:
175
S-PEPS and C-PEPS. The S-PEPS is located in the country of the SP and handles the authentication process, redirecting the authentication requests of foreign citizens to their C-PEPS. The C-PEPS, which is located in the citizens country, carries out the authentication of its citizens. The C-PEPS asserts successful authentications and sends them back to the S-PEPS, which asserts them to the SP.
Scenarios, where each member of an identity federation has its own knowledge representation, require a standard mechanism to represent this knowledge in order to support interoperability. Ontologies are used to provide such a standard resource when formalizing knowledge.
An ontology is an agreement for describing a common model to be shared among administrative and non-administrative parties. This agreement permits information exchange in a human-readable and under-185 standable manner [16] .
Ontologies can improve SI by adjusting various terms to make them useful in several applications.
Ontologies also provide structured vocabularies describing a formal specification of shared concepts in a given domain, contributing to solving semantic heterogeneity. Despite being a useful resource to promote semantic interoperability, ontologies matching and merging constitute the main challenge [14] of interoperability and
The potential of using ontologies for identity federation has already been recognized before [17] . However, these works rely on adopting a common ontology definition for person entity attributes. This approach is not directly applicable in our context scenario, as we consider different countries and hence different attribute definitions. 
Ontology Alignment
Even when systems use ontologies for knowledge description, the number of parties involved in the identity federations (e.g. Stork, eIDAS 6 ) is usually large. As a consequence, several different ontologies can be used to do this representation. Ontology alignment finds equivalences between entities semantically correlated in ontologies. These equivalences can promote interoperability through query answering, or data 200 translation [18] . Ontology alignment is used to obtain a common knowledge representation among entities (e. likelihood of the correspondence [19] .
A correspondence [18] is a 4-tuple:
id, e 1 , e 2 , r
where:
• id is an identifier for the given correspondence;
• e 1 and e 2 are entities, e.g. classes and properties of the first and the second ontology, respectively; and
• r is a relation, e.g., equivalence (=), more general ( ), disjointness (⊥), holding between e 1 and e 2 .
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Correspondences have some associated metadata, e.g.: confidence (on a [0.0, 1.0] scale), where 1 represents the maximum probability that the relation holds.
The Ontology Alignment Evaluation Initiative 7 (OAEI), which promotes annual evaluations of matching systems, proposes the usage of three metrics to assess the confidence level taken by these matching systems [18] , namely:
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• Precision: measures correctness;
• Recall: measures the completeness;
• F-Measure: aggregates both previous metrics.
Where:
• TP stands for True Positive values;
• FP are the False Positive values;
• Privacy terminology includes [20] terms such as data controller, data processor and data subject. Their meaning is as follows:
• Data Controller: An entity which determines the purposes for which and the way in which any item of personal information is processed.
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• Data Processor: An entity which processes personal information on behalf of and upon the instructions of the Data Controller.
• Data Subject: An identified, or identifiable individual to whom the personal information is related directly or indirectly.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Privacy Framework defines some 245 basic principles with regard to fair information practices [22] , namely:
• Collection Limitation Principle: There should be limits to the acquisition of personal data. Personal data should be obtained according to the law and by fair means.
• Data Quality Principle: Personal data should be related to the purposes for which they are to be employed, should be correct and kept up-to-date.
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• Purpose Specification Principle: The purposes for collecting personal data should be specified beforehand and the succeeding use limited to those purposes.
• Use Limitation Principle: Personal data should not be revealed, made accessible or employed for purposes other than those defined in accordance with Purpose Specification Principle except:
1. with permission of the data subject; or 255 2. by the law's authority.
• Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected by security safeguards against risks such as loss, unauthorized access, destruction, use, changes or disclosure of data.
• Openness Principle: There should be a comprehensive policy of openness about evolving, practices, and policies on personal data.
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• Individual Participation Principle: Individuals should have the right:
1. to obtain from a data controller a confirmation of whether or not it has data relating to them; 2. to be communicated about data relating to them; 3. to be given reasons if (a) and (b) are denied, and to be able to challenge such denial;
4. to challenge data relating to them and, if successful, to have the data deleted, corrected, supple-265 mented or improved.
• Accountability Principle: A data controller should be responsible for complying with rules which give effect to the principles declared above.
Transferring user data among several MS's identity systems implies being careful about how to send this data to each MS in order to not reveal it (Use Limitation Principle). User privacy and the minimum-270 disclosure rule must be respected (Security Safeguards Principle). Some solutions to address the Use Limitation Principle feature:
• Aggregated Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge (AgZKPK) [23] ;
• Oblivious Commitment Based Envelope (OCBE), [24] ;
• Locality-Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [9] . 
Related Work
Several solutions exist to achieve ontology alignment in practice (e.g. AlignAPI, PROMPT, and XMAP) and to perform queries in blinded text values (e.g. MinHash, Nilsimsa, and TLSH). These are key features in the proposed solution since they provide the building blocks to make the systems interoperable and do not disclose any information except that requested from the user. 
Ontology-Alignment
Since understanding the concepts adopted by each party is crucial to aggregate the attributes they store, merely applying ontologies to model these concepts is not enough to promote data interoperability. A robust asset to align the different ontologies is as important as a good definition of the knowledge representation applied.
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Two or more ontologies are aligned to enable interested entities to employ a common terminology to communicate with each other. The following subsections briefly describe three of the most commonly used ontology alignment solutions.
AlignAPI
The Alignment API (AlignAPI 8 ) can be applied for the development, integration, and composition of 290 matchers [25] . Its reference implementation aims to promote the development of tools for manipulating alignments and calling matchers [26] .
PROMPT
PROMPT 9 is an algorithm and a tool for merging and aligning ontologies [27] . It demands direct interaction with the user. The tool takes two ontologies as input [28] and guides the user through the 295 process of creating a merged/aligned ontology.
XMAP
The XMAP 10 is a high-precision ontology matching system that can perform matching on large ontologies [29] . It uses the UMLS 11 and WordNet 12 to compute a synonymy degree between two concepts in several ontologies, using their context. The XMAP relies on the Microsoft Translate API 13 to operate with 300 ontologies in multiple languages.
Locality-Sensitive Hashing Functions
LSH Functions ensure that the collision probability is higher for closer objects (similar values) than for those that are far (different attribute values) [30, 31] . Locality-sensitive hashing functions perform a similarity query on an LSH index in two steps [32] : 305 1. Selecting candidate objects for a given query q using LSH functions; and 2. Ranking these objects according to their distances to q.
Performing similarity queries on blinded data would also be possible using homomorphic encryption, but LSH is less complex [33] , which improves the performance of the matching verification process. In the following subsections, we succinctly describe existing implementations of LSH functions. 
MinHash
MinHash evaluates the similarity of any two sets demanding only a constant number of comparisons [34] . MinHash performs the evaluation by extracting a representation h k (S) of a set S using deterministic sampling. This representation h k (S) has a constant size k, independent from |S|. The computation of h k (S) incurs a complexity linear in set sizes.
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8 http://alignapi.gforge.inria.fr/ 9 http://protegewiki.stanford.edu/wiki/PROMPT 10 http://www.labged.net/index.php?rubrique=mapage38 11 https://www.nlm.nih.gov/research/umls/ 12 https://wordnet.princeton.edu/ 13 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/translator/translatorapi.aspx Nilsimsa [35] is a Locality-Sensitive Hashing function that receives an arbitrary input and outputs an n-bit digest. It adopts n buckets to count the trigrams that appear in the input and converts the counts to an n-bit digest. The similarity evaluation between two inputs is conducted comparing the corresponding position of the two Nilsimsa digests and counting the number of corresponding bits. The algorithm counts 320 the number of corresponding bits of the two Nilsimsa digests in the same position to recognize the similarity between two inputs [36] . The higher the number of corresponding bits, the more similar the two documents.
Trend Locality Sensitive Hashing -TLSH
This method computes a TLSH value from given input data. The TLSH value is obtained by summing up the distance 14 between the digest headers and the digest bodies. The resulting distance score ranges 325 from 0 to 1000+. Digests with a distance ≤ 100 are considered to be similar. Digests with a distance > 100 are considered not similar. The assessment of the TLSH digest of the byte string follows these steps [37, 38 ]:
1. Process the byte string using a sliding window to populate an array of bucket counts;
2. Calculate the quartile points, q 1 , q 2 , and q 3 ;
Define the digest header values as a function of:
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(a) the length of the file;
(b) the quartile points calculated in step (2); and (c) a checksum.
4. Define the digest body by processing the bucket array;
5. Produce the output digest by concatenating the digest header from step (3) and the digest body from 335 step (4).
Interoperability for Electronic Identities
Achieving interoperability between electronic-identity systems has been a topic of scientific interest for years. Large research projects such as STORK and STORK 2.0 have not only yielded a specification and implementation of an interoperability framework that ensures interoperability between European national 340 identity systems, but have also produced various publications that address the topic from a scientific perspective [15, 39, 40] .
In addition to these works, other authors have approached the topic of eID interoperability as well.
In [41] , the authors present a review on identity management frameworks. They assess existing solutions 14 The assessment of the distance occurs in a process similar to the Hamming distance.
location independence (e.g. allowing users to provide their attributes independent of the respective attribute provider's location). Our work addresses these relevant aspects by not storing any user attribute and by allowing the user to specify the preferred AP.
Another interesting work related to our proposal has been introduced by Esposito [42] . The focus of this work lies on interoperable, dynamic and privacy-preserving access-control solutions for cloud data 
Proposed Solution
Surveying related work reveals that there is currently no satisfactory solution that enables privacypreserving attribute aggregation in federated identity systems. In this section, we propose a solution to bridge this gap.
The key element of our proposed solution is a component called User Identification Strengthening [6]
360 (UsIdS). This component becomes part of federated identity management systems as shown in Figure 1 and extends these systems with the following features:
• Ontology Mapping with privacy preservation;
• Language translation;
• History-based confidence level improvement; and
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• Third Party AP chain construction. During a user-authentication process, an iterative process involving the user is executed. In this process, required attributes are aggregated and delivered to the SP. Figure 1 presents an overview of the UsIdS workflow. A typical authentication process comprises the following steps. The user accesses an SP using its IS Proxy (IS-IdPP) as IdP (Fig. 1, Step 1) . The SP redirects to the user's IS-IdPP to obtain the user's After obtaining the attributes, and finding a way to merge them, the produced facet is provided to the SP 385 ( Fig. 1, Step 7 ). The communication process encompasses different messages. Figure 2 describes the details of the communication between the UsIdS and each AP, omitting the authentication messages for the sake of simplicity.
Our proposed solution comprises two distinct phases. The goal of the first phase is to find a common identifier between the participating attribute providers. This common identifier is nothing more than the 390 user's set of attributes, shared by both attribute providers, which identify the user uniquely and may, consequently, be used to link both user facets.
The strategy to find such an identifier has two alternative paths. Each path is tried in sequence from the most simple to the most complex one until one succeeds. The first phase of the protocol is the most complex. Moreover, it is the one where the process of aligning ontologies is necessary given that it is not expected that every AP will use the same ontology. The process of translating the language of the involved ontologies also takes place in this phase. The goal of this phase is finding common key identifiers between APs.
Both paths in the first phase share a common procedure (Algorithms 1 and 2), with small differences.
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The difference between the first path and second path is that the second path runs the same procedure twice, one between a third party AP T and AP A and another one between AP T and AP B . This yields two key identifiers that can be transitively coupled as though they were only one.
The UsIdS runs both steps with the help of the user that interacts with the APs providing, or not, their consent on the attribute exchange. In the following, the user's role in the communication process between 420 the UsIdS and APs is omitted, but it is assumed that there is always an authenticated user performing the communication with the APs.
Multi Language Alignment
The UsIdS starts by requesting ontologies from the attribute provider and the service provider. It then verifies the language of the provided ontologies. If they do not have the idiom of the ontology in the UsIdS, to communicate with both APs using their terminologies. The Confidence Level of each attribute pair aligned (CL);
Algorithm 1 Ontology Aligning Process
5:
The 9:
10:
:
OR = removeDuplicated(OR)
13:
saveToDB(OR) A copy of O A and O B is stored on local file system.
14:
return OR, CL, Comp A , Comp B
Common Key Identifier
The resulting OR is used to request attributes from each AP x (where x stands for A or B). The OR is a common subset of attributes in that AP x , and each AP should verify if it is sufficient to identify the user uniquely. Note that the OR may not be sufficient to uniquely identify every user in AP x , but it may 445 be adequate to identify the requesting user uniquely at a specific time. For instance, taking the attributes Given Name and Nationality may not be sufficient to identify a user in any student database. However, performing a search in a specific database with a specific name and nationality may be enough to return just one record.
Assuming that AP (r, a) stands for the list of attribute values, where r stands for the requesting user,
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and a for the list of attribute names. And that OR AP stands for a list of attribute names in the ontology relation OR for that specific AP . An AP classifies the OR as a Key Identifier (KI) for the requesting user r if there isn't another user in the AP with the same set of values for the attribute in the OR, formally:
The algorithm takes as input the full ontological relation OR, from Algorithm 1, the user identification 455 on that AP U ID, and the attribute name to be checked attrN ame. Then the value of the attribute in the OR for that specific user is assigned to a local variable attrV alue. attrV alue is then submitted in a query to verify the number of users with that attribute value for that attribute name. If the number of users is one, then that attribute is a key identifier for that user on that AP. It is important to notice that performing this verification in this way does not disclose any information, besides true or false, about that attribute set of the user. If the attribute set is a KI for both APs, then it is called a CKI, and phase 1 stops. 
Third Party AP
When it is not possible to identify the user uniquely, a third-party AP (AP T ) strategy is applied. This AP T is no more than an element acting as a link between two other APs. The process starts by finding an AP T for which there is a OR T A and a OR T B classified as CKI for the same user.
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The strategy for finding the AP T with the necessary characteristics is by sequentially testing every AP known by the UsIdS. For larger lists, the search can be speeded up by using heuristics like the number of times that the OR between two APs was classified as CKI 16 , or the length of the OR (longer ORs have more probability of being a CKI than others).
The protocol to check that either OR T A or OR T B is a CKI is similar to the one described earlier. They 470 differ because AP T must verify that the ORs are checked for the same user, which is easier if they are checked at the same time, in the same request.
Second Phase
The second phase of the protocol retrieves the attribute values from both APs, checks that the shared attributes have the same value in those APs, and return the result to the SP. In this phase, the algorithm 475 run by the UsIdS faces two challenges. The first challenge is to compare attributes from different ontologies that are not directly comparable. The second challenge is to match attributes without knowing some of their values. In fact, some attributes are used only to match the facets from different attribute providers.
Since those attributes are not in Req, the user should not be asked to reveal them.
The strategy to handle the first challenge is to use similarity functions S, which combine Hamming
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Distances with other heuristics to calculate a distance between the values in both APs. The strategy to handle the second challenge is to use Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) functions, like Nilsimsa [43] , which allows comparison with the signatures using the same kind of similarity functions that are used to match clear values.
16 An OR can be classified as CKI for one user and fail to be classified as a CKI for another user.
of performance tests conducted in [9] . The Nisilma function is transparently applied by each AP whenever the UsIdS requests an attribute value that is not in Req. The Algorithm 3 uses these two strategies. It returns a composed facet with all the attributes requested by the SP, or an error if the attributes returned by both APs do not match.
Algorithm 3 Get Unified User Facet
1: Data:
The merged ontology (Ontological Relation) from both 2:
APs (OR);
3:
The ACI value obtained on previous interactions;
4:
The attribute set requested by the SP (Req);
5:
Distance threshold between values (d);
6:
The ontologies from AP A (O A ) and AP B (O B );
7:
The complements Comp A and Comp B .
8:
Result: An array, F acet, which provides the confidence level of
9:
matches of each attribute in Req, and the ACI.
10: function findMatches(OR, Req, d, O A , O B )
11:
12:
for (attrN ame ∈ SharAttr) do
13:
V al A = AP A (U serID, attrN ame, Req)
14:
V al B = AP B (U serID, attrN ame, Req)
15:
16:
if (cl == 0) then OR.ORCI++
17:
if (cl ≤ d) and (attrN ame ∈ Req) then
18:
F acet+ = (attrN ame, V al A , cl)
19:
else 20:
return error
21:
for (attrN ame ∈ Comp A ) do
22:
if (attrN ame ∈ Req) then
23:
24:
F acet+ = (attrN ame, V al A , 0)
25:
for (attrN ame ∈ Comp B ) do
26:
27:
28:
F acet+ = (attrN ame, V al B , 0)
29:
ACI = ACI/len(F acet) * OR.ORCI
30:
return F acet, ACI 
Alignment Confidence Improvement
Ontology alignment is a threshold matching process that can be tuned to provide almost no false positives.
However, being too restrictive results in many false negatives, especially because attribute names are often very small words or sequences of words. A high number of false negatives defeats the alignment's purpose and prevents users from finding CKI between APs.
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In the specified context, it is common that the same APs are used in several aggregation procedures.
These recurrent interactions between/among the APs can provide valuable information to the previously established ontology alignments. We assume that previous alignments can be improved on subsequent alignments (cf. 4.3.5). For instance, if two attributes names from different ontologies are wrongly paired, most comparisons of user values of those attributes will be false, providing a hint about the attributes 515 misalignment.
Every alignment generated between AP Ontologies is stored in a database for future use and improvement.
Alignments do not have private data, although their confidence levels are calculated using the attribute values of previous facet aggregations. Ontology alignment confidence levels are updated on every facet merging request using the alignment, as a sub-product of the facet merging confidence level. 
Facet Merging Confidence Level
The ultimate goal of the UsIdS is to provide the SP with a single set of attributes comprising two facets of the same user, together with a confidence level on the correctness of that merger. This confidence level must be very high for the process to be useful. Unfortunately, calculating it is not trivial. There are a number of variables in the calculation, for which it is only possible to provide a rough approximation. However, many 525 of them have a relatively low impact on the calculation and may be underestimated without much loss of precision.
In this Section we provide a lower bound estimation of the confidence level for each facet merger.
Let M n be the random variable representing the n th facet merger involving two APs. Then, P (M n ) denotes the probability of both facets belonging to the same user. Recall that the confidence level of the 530 ontology alignment evolves with the number of previous facet mergers using the same APs.
Both facets are aligned in pairs A j = (A 0 j , A 1 j ), representing the j th attribute from Ontology 0 and Ontology 1, respectively, and the semantic accuracy of that alignment is denoted by P n (A j ).
The process of verifying that two facets belong to the same user involves comparing the attribute values of each aligned attribute pair. The attribute value pairs to compare, at each iteration n, are denoted by
, and the probability of both values being the same is denoted by P (V nj ).
Probability Distribution Function of M n
According to the Baye's Theorem
where the Odds are the number of times that it is more probable that a hypothesis occurs against its opposite, before (P riorOdds) or after (P osteriorOdds) for a given event are detected. The Likelihood represents the number of times that a given event is more probable if the hypothesis is evaluated as true 540 against its evaluation as false.
Let O(M n ) be the Posterior Odds of M n , O(M n ) the Prior Odds, and L(V nj , M n ) the Likelihood of V nj under the hypothesis M n , then the probability distribution function P (M n ) is given by
where
Assuming that the probability, beforehand, of two given facets belonging to the same user is 50%, i.e. before any validation, the facets are equally probable to be from the same user or different users, then O(M n ) is equal to 1. This is a conservative assumption because if the user was able to authenticate in both APs then it is more probable that it is the same user than two different users. 
Attribute Likelihood Assessment
The likelihood that an attribute pair is equal is given by:
• The probability of the attribute pair is equal given that the hypothesis M n is true P (V nj |M n ); over
• The probability that they are equal given that the hypothesis M n is false P (V nj |M n ).
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where P (V nj |M n ) is provided by the Nilsimsa Distance algorithm over the value pair V nj = (V 0 nj , V 1 nj ), and 550 P (V nj |M n ) denotes the probability of a false positive, that may happen due to two main reasons:
1. The attribute values are the same but they are from two semantically distinct attributes, which were not aligned correctly (e.g. Given Name from one user and Last Name from another). The probability of such an event is denoted by P (V nj ∩ A l |M n ).
2. Two users share the same attribute (e.g. two users with the same Given Name), which is denoted by 555 the probability P (V nj ∩ A i |M n ).
Thus
denotes the probability of a false positive if the alignment is incorrect;
• P (V nj |M n ∩ A i ) denotes the probability of a false positive if the alignment on that attribute is correct;
• P n−1 (A j ) denotes the trust on the alignment after the previous assessment. 
False Positives with Correct Alignment
The probability P (V nj |M n ∩ A i ) is directly proportional to the number of repetitions of each attribute value. For instance, if there are many users with the same given name, the probability of this false positive is high.
Let |A i j | denote the average number of users with the same attribute value A j in AP i , and |AP i | denote the total number of users in the repository AP i , with i = 0, 1; then:
False Positives with Wrong Alignment
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The probability P (V nj |M n ∩ A j ) increases with the frequency of attribute values V nj . The actual number of equal attribute values depends on many factors (the type of value, the universe of values in the AP, etc.) although it is expectable that smaller words or sentences are more prone to be repeated than longer words/sentences [44] , which may provide an estimate on this probability.
Let |V nj | denote the length (number of characters) of the values of V nj , and F(d) the frequency of the words/sentences with dimension d, that exists in the ontology's language, then assuming that the number 23 of users in the APs is big, the probability may be approximated by:
and, according to [44] the frequency of the words by length d, given by:
Trust on the Alignment
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The alignment trust P n−1 (A j ) changes as the number of assessments n grows. The improvement on the alignment confidence level can be seen as a sub-product of the facet merger confidence level calculation. As depicted in Equation 9 the confidence level of the facet merger depends on the alignment confidence level
Pˆ{n-1}(A j), but the alignment confidence level also depends on the confidence level of the previous facet mergers. According to Bayes's theorem
and
where P 0 (A j ) denotes the initial alignment probability of attribute j, after applying the Ontology alignment algorithm (e.g. AlignAPI), and L(V mj , A j ) denotes the likelihood of the attribute value pair being equal under the hypothesis that the alignment is correct.
The Likelihood L(V mj , A j ) is given by:
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• The probability that the attribute value pair V mj is equal, if the alignment on that attribute A j is correct (P (V mj |A j )); over
• The probability that the attribute value pair V mj is equal, if the alignment on that attribute A j is incorrect (P (V mj |A j )).
As before, P (V mj |A j ) is set by the Nilsima Distance algorithm over the pair V mj , while P (V mj |A j )
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denotes the probability of a true or false positive with an incorrect alignment:
1. The false positive is denoted by P (V mj ∩ M m |A j ), occurs when two users have the same value in two different semantic attributes (e.g. the given name of one is equal to the surname of the other);
2. The true positive, denoted by P (V mj ∩M m |A j ), occurs when one user shares the same value in different attributes (e.g. one user with same given name and last name).
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Therefore:
is given by eq. 11;
• P (V mj |A j ∩ M m ) denotes the probability that a single user has two attributes with the same value (e.g. same surname and given name).
using the same strategy of equation 11, P (V mj |A j ∩ M m ) may be majorated by
where |A 
Prototype Implementation
To evaluate the practicability of the proposed solution, we developed a proof-of-concept prototype implementation. The implementation comprises a Service Provider and an Attribute Provider as illustrated in Figure 3 using RESTful Web Services written in Java with the JAX-RS RESTFul API 17 . We also implemented the test ontologies representing user attributes used in our experiments. Our implementation For simplicity, the SP plays both the SP and one of the APs roles, which may in fact be a real valid scenario, as it is not uncommon for SPs to store data about their users.
The multi-language feature (Subsection 4.1.1) has been developed using the Yandex API 18 , which pro-
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vides the services needed to identify the language and to translate the attribute names before the alignment process begins (Fig. 3, Step 1) . Next, the AlignAPI [26] performs the initial ontology alignment (Fig. 3, Step 1), and the Nilsimsa LSH function [36] carries out the blinding procedure of the attribute values (Fig.   3, Step 2). Additionally, the prototype implements a confidence level improvement algorithm (Fig. 3, Step 2 -see Subsection 4.2.1) and the third party AP strategy as described in Subsection 4.1.4 (Fig. 3, Step 3).
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Figure 3 depicts the four communication steps over the two phases described in Section 4, which are detailed below.
First Phase
The First Phase, as described previously, performs the alignment between the ontologies of both involved parties (i.e. AP and SP ). The approach adopted was to put the threshold of the ontology alignment step so 
2:
to be checked; 3: Result: True if the ontology is in the UsIdS's language, or false 4:
and the translated version of the ontology otherwise.
5: function isSameLanguage(O Lang ) 6:
if (ontoLang == langU sIdS) then
8:
return True
9:
else
10:
O T ranslated = getT ranslV er(O Lang , langU sIdS)
11:
saveTranslVer(O T ranslated )
12:
return False
Ontology Alignment
In the Ontology Alignment step (Fig. 3, Step 1) , the service provider submits its ontology (O SP ) to Every time an interaction occurs with the UsIdS, the interacting party (e.g. AP) transmits its ontology to it. Sending its ontology is an important behaviour because the UsIdS checks for changes in the provided 635 ontology using the one it has stored for that party. If both ontologies are the same, the UsIdS jumps to the Alignment Improvement execution discarding the remaining steps.
Alignment Improvement
In the Alignment Improvement (Fig. 3, Step 2), the UsIdS attempts to improve the confidence levels of the attribute-name pairs obtained previously (i.e. Ontology Alignment). The UsIdS requests from both levels (CLs) lower than 100%. Then, the UsIdS evaluates the similarity of the blinded values received from the SP and the AP by applying the Nilsimsa Distance (ND) and updates the respective confidence levels (CL) for each attribute alignment (cf. Section 4.3.5).
AP T Finding
If the provided attributes are not sufficient to establish a Common Key Identifier (cf. Section 4.1.3), i.e. it
is not possible to ensure that it is the same user, the UsIdS starts a search on the database of ontological relations (ORs) for a third party attribute provider (AP T ).
To perform this search procedure, the UsIdS looks for all ORs, in which that user has attributes (i.e. AP T candidates, AP T Cand ). Then it proceeds by checking their ontologies trying to find a common key identifier 650 between its ontology and the AP T Cand . If the UsIdS finds a key identifier in an attribute provider (AP T Cand )
for that user and a key identifier is found with two other attribute providers, then that AP T Cand acts as an AP T between the other two APs.
Second Phase
The second phase handles the actual exchange of attributes. The conducted ontology alignment process 655 enables SP and APs to exchange attributes on their own terminology. The ontology alignment produced is employed to map the attributes needed by the service provider using O SP , to the vocabulary used by the attribute provider, i.e.: O AP through the UsIdS. This way, the attribute provider can perform a query on its database using its terminology. The attribute provider uses the attributes requested by the service provider to parameterize a query, which the attribute provider executes on its database. Finally, the attribute provider 660 sends back to the service provider the set of attribute names and values requested (Fig. 3, Step 4), together with the confidence level of the facet aggregation.
Evaluation
We developed different test scenarios to evaluate our proposed solution. The first scenario uses two ontologies, one in English (O E ) and one in German (O G ), and checks the alignment between them considering The SP and the AP databases were populated with 1000 users randomly generated by a random data 670 generator 19 . Then an intersection of 26 users on both databases was artificially adjusted to allow test execution. These 26 common users are the ones that have their attribute values changed during the test cases execution.
Multi Language Alignment
The purpose of this test scenario is to verify how the proposed solution performs on the language 675
feature. An ontology in German (O G ) was written by a native speaker to evaluate how it would perform.
This ontology contains the same ten attribute names as the ontology in English (O E ).
The original O G was provided to our solution and aligned with O E . After this first alignment, our multi-language feature translated O G into a new version of the ontology but in English (i.e. EN O G ), and only then it was aligned with O E to assess the resulting alignment. The test runs were conducted over four different types of test attribute values, dubbed TC1 to TC4, which account for different similarity scenarios among databases. In TC1, the Best Case Scenario, the CLs are 1 and never get worse. In TC2, the virtually Real World Scenario as in [5] , the CLs are between 0.668 and 1. In TC3 , a Bad Scenario, the CLs are between 0.4 and 0.7, and in TC4, the Worst Scenario, the CLs 690 are between 0.0 and 0.4. The last two test samples where generated using artificial similarity ranges between 40% and 70% (T C3) and 0% and 30% (T C4), and mimic a situation were the alignment is untrustworthy and should not be used at all.
Also in these last two test cases, T C3 and T C4, the experiments were executed using ten different user order sequences in its execution. Then the averages obtained from each result were evaluated. The AP T test scenario aims to verify the feasibility of the proposed Third Party AP feature, as well as its accuracy in establishing links with the involved APs. It means that the UsIdS must be able to establish a link between two attribute providers using a third one (AP) to establish that connection.
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To achieve this goal, three ontologies (O 1 , O 4 , and O 5 ) were developed (see Table 3 ) and assigned to AP A that is the same user using:
Identif ication and O 4 .P assport N umber = O 5 .P assport N umber.
Results
Our test scenarios provided results that support our goals. This subsection presents these results. To perform both alignments with, and without, our translation feature, a threshold of 40% was defined.
This value represents the worst threshold value when using the translation so that all ten attributes translated (EN O G ) have correct alignments identified with O E (see Subsection 5.1.3). Table 4 shows the alignments identified without any translation. As can be observed, Step 1 was able 715 to identify five attribute alignments with confidence levels from 45.45% (Familienname ↔ FamilyName) to
The resulting EN O G has the following ten attribute names(English): in all of the ten attribute names aligned with their corresponding attributes in O E , as can be observed in Table 5 .
Using the translation feature allowed the alignment of the ten attributes of both ontologies. It represents an increment of 100% compared with the approach without any translation, which achieved five attribute alignments.
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It is important to notice that the solution implemented applies an API 20 that currently supports more than 90 different languages.
20 https://tech.yandex.com/translate/doc/dg/concepts/api-overview-docpage/ Note that after a few interactions, the CL of the alignments tends towards zero, which is the overall goal The overall goal of the improvement process is to improve the confidence level that the attribute set delivered to the SP being all from the same user. For test cases TC1 and TC2 the error rate = 1 − CL is 760 very low (≈ 10 −25 for TC1 and 0.08 for TC2)( Figure 7 ).
As expected, the overall confidence level results for test cases TC3 and TC4, the confidence level of the resulted attribute set, are very low, telling the SP that it should not accept them, as they are probably from different users. On the other hand, the values for the certainty that the user who is trying to provide the 6.3.3. Third Party AP
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Our implementation was able to identify, in the already established ontological relations, APs that could act as an AP T . It also provides the attributes it used as a key identifiers in this process.
In our experiment, as described in Subsection 6.2.1, our prototype identified the attributes E-mail, Passport Number and Telephone as Key Identifiers to establishing a link among AP A , AP B , and AP T . e.g. four characters and more extended attributes with e.g. several hundred characters will all result in a 64 character blinded value (i.e. hash value), as shown in Table 6 . Furthermore, SPs are provided with attributes in clear text if, and only if, the user consents. Additionally, the IdPP does not store any attribute value,
Privacy
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but only attribute name pairs relations. The IdPP, also, does not see any attribute value, except the ones the user explicitly consents. Moreover, finally, when requesting attributes from an AP, the IdPP receives a pair with an attribute name and the hash value of the attribute value. Since it does not know anything about the semantics of the attributes asked, the information disclosed to the IdPP is just a string in some language (i.e. attribute name) and an LSH hash value (attribute value). All these features maximize the 785 user's privacy during user-authentication processes. 
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Conclusions
In this article, we have proposed a solution for the attribute aggregation problem in identity federations.
The propose solution i) fits current deployed IdS scenarios, e.g. STORK, eIDAS; ii) is able to handle partially federated identity systems (i.e. scenarios where some APs require local authentication), iii) supports entities
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(SPs and APs) relying on different ontologies and languages, iv) preserves users' privacy while still providing results with high confidence levels.
The ability to handle several languages represents a step forward to applying this solution in crosscountry scenarios. Although we have performed our experiments using English and German only, the employed API supports more than 90 languages. Albeit the accuracy of our implementation depends on the 795 performance of the API, we believe that possible inaccuracies from the translation process can be overcome by adopting lower threshold values in the first step of the ontology alignment process. By lowering the threshold boundaries in initial ontology alignment, the solution eliminates false negatives that may occur, even due to poor translations, leaving the confidence level improvement algorithm the task of eliminating false positives.
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Our solution also improves user privacy by not storing any user data on the UsIdS (Data Processor) and by avoiding the disclosure of attributes required by the matching process but not required by the SP. This is achieved by blinding attribute values using LSH functions. This kind of feature is relevant in our Finally, the third party Attribute Provider feature of our proposed solution promotes a greater level of possibilities in aligning attributes. Taking the diversity of Attribute Providers that each identity system can have in its ecosystem, the AP T approach makes it possible to establish connections between APs whenever a direct link (a common key identifier) is not feasible.
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Overall, our solution represents an encouraging improvement to the interoperability of electronic identities. While these solutions work nowadays on an agreed set of attributes, our solution enables an exchange 36 of attributes between arbitrary identity systems and their entities. Additionally, it improves information quality provided to the SP in deciding to disclose, or not, a service to a user. Finally, it provides more chances to a successful identity linking process by using our AP T approach. This way, our solution can be 815 seen as a useful contribution to a new generation of interoperability solutions for electronic identities. 
Highlights
The proposed solution enables a privacy-preserving attribute aggregation, using ontologyalignment approaches with a history-based improvement function, Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) functions, and Third Party Attribute Providers. The presented solution is compatible to current eID Federations. It can handle partially federated scenarios (scenarios where some attribute providers require local authentication). The solution also handles entities (service providers and attribute providers) with different ontologies and languages. Moreover, it does so without compromising privacy, which nevertheless provides results with high confidence levels.
